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We explore distributive justice and perception of fairness using survey data
from freshmen and senior students of economics and sociology. We analyse the
impact of context and education on their preferences over a hypothetical distribu-
tion of resources between individuals which presents a trade o⁄between e¢ ciency
and equality. With context giving minimal information, economics students are
less likely to favour equality; studying economics in￿ uences the preferences of the
subjects, increasing this di⁄erence. However, when the same problem is inserted
into a meaningful context, the di⁄erence disappears. Four distribution mecha-
nisms are analysed: egalitarianism, maximin, utilitarianism and utilitarianism
with a ￿ oor constraint.
1 Introduction
One of the most interesting results that arises from dictator and ultimatum experiments
is that fairness seems to be a strong concern. Experimental results on the ultimatum
game show that a large fraction of players o⁄er a ￿fair￿allocation and that ￿unfair￿
o⁄ers are systematically rejected. Furthermore, while economists tend to evaluate al-
locations purely quantitatively, these experimental data also suggest that whether an
allocation is seen as ￿fair￿can depend on qualitative factors, the context in which it
is presented and the way it is framed. In addition, the data from dictator experiments
suggest that there is signi￿cant heterogeneity in what people consider fair, with many
people giving nothing as well as many splitting the available resources equally.
The main motivation for the present study is the further investigation of this ev-
idence. However, we will not employ a game theoretical approach. This paper is a
survey based investigation of perception of fairness and attitudes towards distributive
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1justice. We focus on unbiased justice, or justice from the viewpoint of an ￿impartial
spectator￿ , in comparison to many other studies that involve stakes and analyse the
e⁄ect of fairness on the stakeholders.
Our aim is twofold. First, we wish to analyse how context in￿ uences preferences over
a hypothetical distribution of resources and in what way adding justice-related informa-
tion to the context a⁄ects judgements. Second, we explore the impact of education on
perception of fairness. We surveyed both ￿rst and last year undergraduate students of
economics and sociology (hereafter referred to as freshmen and seniors). We submitted
to them di⁄erent versions of a problem involving the distribution of resources between
two individuals in which we asked them to choose the distribution that they consid-
ered the most fair. The two individuals obtain a di⁄erent utility from the resources
and there is, therefore, a trade o⁄ between e¢ ciency, which involves handing more re-
sources to the more productive individual, and equality, which might demand an equal
division even if that would not maximise total output. We will refer to this problem as
the distribution problem. We found that, with a context giving minimal information,
economics students were less likely to favour equality than sociology students and this
di⁄erence was more marked in senior students. Thus, studying economics seemed to
have in￿ uenced the preferences of the subjects over the distribution of resources, while
we found no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the choices of sociology freshmen and seniors.
This evidence suggests that previous survey studies carried out on economics students
(see for example Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) might have obtained di⁄erent results
with a di⁄erent subject population. However, when the same question was rephrased to
give a meaningful context, there was now signi￿cant agreement over which allocation
was fairest and there was no signi￿cant di⁄erence between economics and sociology
students.
Let us consider the ￿rst of our aims. It is well known that perception of fairness and
behaviour related to fairness judgements are context dependent. The set of individuals
being compared, the type of good being distributed, the historical terms of transactions
or the framing of information are all examples of contextual elements. Probably the
most cited study of justice in economics that emphisises the variation of views of fairness
with context is that of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). We are interested on
how such judgements are related to various classes of context. One of the ￿rst examples
of studies in this direction is that of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984), who analysed how
judgements are a⁄ected by context when it speci￿es whether individuals need the goods
to be distributed or they simply like them. There exists by now a large economic
literature on this topic (see Schokkaert and Overlaet, 1989; Gaertner, 1994; Gaertner,
Jungeilges, and Neck, 2001; Gaertner and Jungeilges, 2002; Schokkaert and Devooght,
2003; Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2005, among others) as well as a lot of evidence from
the psychological and sociological literature (for an overview see Konow 2003).
As we will explain in Section 2, we consider the speci￿c problem of how intuitions
of fairness vary with contextual factors which determine whether or not individuals are
responsible for the outcomes of their actions. Several papers from the social choice
literature have addressed this issue (e.g., see Schokkaert and Lagrou, 1983; Schokkaert
2and Overlaet, 1989; Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Cappelen, Słrensen, and Tungod-
den, 2005; Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2005), and a survey of the economic and the
psychological literature on this topic can be found in Konow (2003). We wish to exam-
ine how the relative importance of equality and e¢ ciency can depend on these factors,
and which distributions are considered fair given the type of context. Further, we are
interested in assessing whether clearly specifying the type of context helps overcome
the (possible) di⁄erences in judgments between economics and sociology students and
between freshmen and seniors. The evidence that additional information facilitates the
attainment of a more widespread consensus on what is fair is an important ￿nding
for public debates1. Given that individuals￿judgements may vary according to educa-
tion, profession and age, amongst other categories, this ￿nding should hopefully allow
progress in controversial policy debates.
We investigated four versions of the distribution problem. The versions are all
formally identical, but each of them is characterised by a di⁄erent context. In the ￿rst
version no explanation of the di⁄erence between the two individuals is provided. The
second and the third versions present two distinct explanations: in one, the second
individual is less productive because he is handicapped, in the other, because he works
less hard. The same possible allocations are present in all versions of the problem: an
egalitarian, a utilitarian and a maximin allocation. Context had a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on what the subjects thought was fair and led to greater level of agreement between
the parties: the maximin allocation was preferred when the di⁄erence was due to a
handicap; in case of a di⁄erent e⁄ort the utilitarian distribution was chosen. People
tend to favour the less productive individual when di⁄erent outcomes are due to external
causes (for instance a handicap), but they will punish him if the cause is internal (for
instance for exerting less e⁄ort). The two situations are perceived di⁄erently and imply
distinct reasons for allocating resources. People tend to distribute according to need
when abilities are di⁄erent, and according to e¢ ciency when there is di⁄erence in e⁄ort.
The fourth version presents no explanation of the di⁄erence between the two individuals,
but a ￿ oor is introduced in terms of minimum utility necessary for each individual. The
tension here is that the e¢ cient allocation does not give the minimum survival utility
to the less e¢ cient individual. As well as the previous allocations, a fourth allocation
is permitted, deriving from the application of utilitarianism with a ￿ oor.
Our hypothesis is that when no explanation of the di⁄erence between the individuals
is provided, the subjects involuntarily insert the distribution problem into a determined
context, ￿lling the lack of information according to their personal attitudes and back-
ground. The preference for a particular allocation under this condition will reveal the
relative concern of the subject for either the e¢ ciency or the equality of the distribution.
We will refer to such a preference as the ￿ideology￿of the subject.
Our second purpose is to investigate the in￿ uence of education on perception of
fairness. While a few studies have focused on di⁄erences in judgement (e.g., see Mar-
1Interestingly Babcock et al. (1995) report the opposite result, i.e. adding information increases
bias. The di⁄erence is that the participants in their study have a monetary incentive, so information
is employed in a biased way.
3well and Ames, 1981; Amiel and Cowell, 1999, for a summary of their ￿ndings), most
of the literature on the di⁄erences between economists and non-economists has con-
centrated on their behaviour. Several experiments have been conducted to ascertain
and to analyse any di⁄erent behaviours in terms of propensity to co-operate (through
prisoner￿ s dilemma games), to free ride (for instance, in the provision of public goods)
or in the degree of sel￿shness.
Both experiments with monetary incentives and surveys are valuable instruments
to explore fairness, according to the purpose of the analysis. Di⁄erences in judgement
can be as relevant as di⁄erences in behaviour, depending on the situation and the
circumstances. In daily life people￿ s intuitions of fairness determine not only their
behaviour but also their judgements of situations in which they are not directly involved.
People often act on unbiased views when their stakes are low or negligible, for example
as voters or in the case of juries. Further, even when personal stakes are relatively high
and agents trade-o⁄ self-interest and social preferences, it is interesting to examine
the fairness point against which the self-interest point is being traded o⁄. Economists
participate in boards, are members of councils, vote and legislate. It is important to
analyse whether their judgements di⁄er from other people￿ s and to what extent this
is context-related. When the purpose is to explore intuitions of fairness, eliminating
monetary stakes reduces self-interest bias and presents the advantage of encouraging
￿participants to prescind and abstract from personal stakes￿(Konow 2003, p. 1191)2.
In conducting our analysis, we will proceed as follows. Having found that an ide-
ological di⁄erence does exist we will show that a signi￿cant agreement can be reached
clarifying the context of the distribution. Further, we have to investigate the reasons
for this di⁄erence. The literature that compares economists and non-economists sug-
gests that the di⁄erences could be due to two causes. They may be the result of a
self-selection process or of training in economics. These two conjectures have been
called the selection and the learning hypothesis (Carter and Irons, 1991). Comparing
the answers of freshmen students of the two courses will show the existence of a selec-
tion e⁄ect. Comparing the answers given by freshmen and senior students of the same
course, we will ￿nd that a learning e⁄ect only exists for economics students.
In Section 2 we will discuss how context relates to responsibility concerns and present
the distribution mechanisms examined in our analysis. Section 3 reports the results of
the most prominent experiments directed to compare economists and non-economists.
In Section 4 we will discuss the design of the questionnaire and the hypotheses that we
are going to test. Section 5 displays the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Equality, E¢ ciency and Responsibility
In any discussion of fairness and justice theories a fundamental issue is the con￿ ict be-
tween equality and e¢ ciency. In an excellent survey on positive and normative theories
of justice James Konow (2003) examines this contrast describing the principles that are
2See also Fong (2001).
4behind these concepts: the Need Principle and the E¢ ciency Principle. The former
invokes the equal satisfaction of basic needs and inspires theories such as egalitarianism
and Rawls￿theory of justice (1971). The latter advocates maximising surplus and is
most closely associated with utilitarianism.
We examine the problem of how the balance between e¢ ciency and equality is
in￿ uenced by responsibility considerations. Further we wish to verify whether inserting
the problem into a meaningful context, which clearly states who can be held accountable
for a certain outcome and who cannot, leads to a greater consensus on what is considered
just.
The issue of responsibility has been investigated by philosophers as well as by econo-
mists and psychologists, focusing mainly on two questions. First, how to characterise
responsibility and what does make a person accountable for an outcome. The second
question is related to the critique of the welfarist interpretation (see Fleurbaey, 1998,
for a survey of this literature). Sen (1992) de￿nes the set of welfarist theories as those
theories that take utilities as the only relevant personal features and di⁄er between them
in the choice of combining characteristics. The insu¢ ciency of the welfarist framework
to capture the complexity of the distribution problem was already the main conclusion
reached by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) and several subsequent questionnaire-studies
abandoned the welfarist perspective in their analysis (see Schokkaert and Overlaet,
1989; Gaertner, 1994; Gaertner, Jungeilges, and Neck, 2001; Gaertner and Jungeilges,
2002; Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2005, among oth-
ers). Further, there exists by now a large literature in social choice about how to incor-
porate ideas of responsibility in the social evaluations (for an overview see Fleurbaey
and Maniquet, forthcoming). Although we appreciate the importance of this literature,
we are mainly concerned with the ￿rst question, that is the issue of characterising re-
sponsibility. Given the goals of our investigation, it seemed somewhat clearer to adopt
a welfarist interpretation without adding further complications to the analysis and we
believe that our results correctly represent the moral intuitions of the subjects.
Although a concern for individual responsibility was present in Rawls (1971) and Sen
(1980), with regards to primary goods and functionings respectively, Dworkin (1981) has
been the ￿rst among political philosophers to explicitly focus on this issue. Dworkin
considers that a person must be held responsible for her preferences whether or not
they are voluntarily cultivated, as long as she identi￿es with them, but she cannot
be held accountable for her resources. He also makes a helpful distinction between
￿option luck￿ , which is the output of a gamble explicitly taken, and ￿brute luck￿ ,
which is an output in which no gamble was entered into. Thus option luck is a matter
of choice and hence fair, while brute luck is morally arbitrary and therefore unfair.
Arneson (1989, 1990) and Cohen (1989) proposed a revision of what Cohen (1989) called
￿Dworkin￿ s cut￿ , that is the division between preferences and resources. Although they
articulate their positions di⁄erently,.both these authors agree that the ￿right cut is
between responsibility and bad luck, not between preferences and resources￿(Cohen,
1989, p. 921). The debate is far from being closed and Roemer (1993) has introduced
a relativistic position, proposing that the cut between responsibility and compensation
5can be seen as cultural-dependent.
Economists have analysed the importance of responsibility considerations in percep-
tion of fairness through several questionnaire-studies and experiments and have tried to
single out which characteristics are considered to be within the control of an individual
and which are not (see Schokkaert and Lagrou, 1983; Schokkaert and Overlaet, 1989;
Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Cappelen, Słrensen, and Tungodden, 2005; Gaertner
and Schwettmann, 2005, among others). A thorough review of this literature and its
relations with social psychology can be found in Konow (2003). The author reports
the results of several experiments and surveys in economics and in psychology that
indicate that individuals are held accountable for their e⁄ort and choices that a⁄ect
their contribution, but they are not considered responsible for their birth, brute luck
and choices that do not a⁄ect their productivity. Such results seem to con￿rm the
predictions of attribution theory. Attribution theory is a social psychology theory ini-
tiated by Heider (1958) that explains behaviour on the basis of causal attributions of
responsibility. According to this theory, people infer causes of events and evaluate to
what extent an agent has contributed to the outcome, holding the agent responsible
only for those factors that the agent can in￿ uence. As Konow (2003) suggests ￿attri-
bution theory provides a powerful criterion for describing desert according to the views
of most people￿(p. 1214).
In our empirical investigation, we build a distribution problem such that the theories
inspired by the Need Principle advocate allocations of resources substantially di⁄erent
from the distribution that would result if the E¢ ciency Principle was applied. In the
base treatment, where the context of the problem is not clari￿ed, it is not clear what
the di⁄erent productivity of the two individuals depends on. We then examine two
classes of context, which ￿ll the gap of information and enable the subjects to establish
whether the agents can or cannot be held accountable for their productivity. In one
the di⁄erent productivity is explained in terms of brute luck, a factor that is out of
the control of the individuals; in the other it depends on e⁄ort, an element that they
can control. Following Konow (2000) we will refer to ￿exogenous di⁄erences￿in the
￿rst case and ￿discretionary di⁄erences￿in the second. Finally we consider a version
of the distribution problem in which ￿need￿considerations are involved; this treatment
is identical to the ￿rst one except for the introduction of a threshold under which the
individuals do not survive.
Let us consider the distribution mechanisms that will be examined in our analysis.
Besides the Egalitarian solution we are going to consider three other distribution mech-
anisms, whose application may determine particular departures from equality. Let us
examine these distribution principles.
Many di⁄erent forms of utilitarianism exist, but we will refer to it as the principle
that advocates the maximisation of the sum of individual utilities.
Rawls￿(1971) theory of justice was conceived as an alternative to utilitarianism, in
all of its forms, and has become a powerful contestant to utilitarian theory in recent
years. Rawls proposes two principles of justice that are meant to rule the basic structure
of society and determine the division of advantages of social cooperation. The above
6principles would result from a social contract made by rational individuals behind a ￿veil
of ignorance￿ , which would guarantee the impartiality of the parties. While the ￿rst
principle rules the scheme of liberties each person has the right to, the second principle
determines which social and economic inequalities are acceptable. The distribution
mechanism we are interested in is what Rawls refers to as the maximin equity criterion,
which came subsequently to be known as the di⁄erence principle. It is identi￿able with
the ￿rst part of the second principle, which is de￿ned as following: ￿Social and economic
inequalities are to meet two conditions: they must be (a) to the greatest expected
bene￿t of the least advantaged members of society (the maximin equity criterion) and
(b) attached to o¢ ces and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.￿(Rawls, 1974, p. 142). This criterion is clearly opposed to the utilitarian
that only cares about maximising utility regardless of its distribution.
Finally, utilitarianism with a ￿ oor is a mechanism that prescribes the maximisation
of the average utility with a ￿ oor constraint. Preferences for distributions prescribed by
the application of this principle have been tested in several experiments (e.g. Frohlich,
Oppenheimer, and Eavy, 1987a, 1987b; Lissowsky, Tyszka, and Okrasa, 1991).
Rawls￿theory of justice￿ s informational basis does not coincide with the utilitarian.
In the utilitarian theory the informational basis consists only of the utilities of the
individuals in the states of a⁄airs under evaluation. Rawls￿theory, on the contrary,
ranks the di⁄erent states of a⁄airs according to the distribution of primary goods, that
are de￿ned as anything any rational person wants and will want regardless of his plan
of life or his place in the social scheme. As we mentioned above we are going to consider
all of the distribution mechanisms discussed, including the maximin criterion, from a
welfarist perspective. Among the welfarist theories, Sen (1992) recalls the utility-based
maximin as that distribution mechanism that prescribes to maximise the utility of the
least advantaged individual. This is the interpretation that we are going to assume in
the course of our analysis.
3 Are Economists Di⁄erent?
Most of the literature on the di⁄erences between economists and non-economists has
concentrated on di⁄erences in behaviour. Amiel and Cowell (1999) summarise some
of their ￿ndings on the di⁄erent moral intuitions of economists and non-economists.
They focused mainly on the acceptance of the monotonicity axiom, a concept which
is very close to the Pareto principle3. Their results show that the monotonicity axiom
was not a very popular concept. However, it was generally accepted more favourably
by economics students than by their sociologist colleagues.
Marwell and Ames (1981) conducted the ￿rst study that compared economists and
non-economists, through an experiment that called for private contributions to public
goods. They found that ￿rst-year graduate students in economics are much more likely
3While the Pareto criterion is expressed in terms of utility ￿the monotonicity axiom is usually put
in terms of persons￿incomes￿(Amiel and Cowell, 1999, p. 64).
7than others to free ride. They conjectured that there might be two reasons for why
economists might behave di⁄erently, de￿ned by Carter and Irons (1991) as the selection
and the learning hypothesis. However, Marwell and Ames did not check the extent
to which this di⁄erence is due to one hypothesis or the other (or to both of them).
Further, they collected a wide range of information regarding the di⁄erent perceptions,
expectations and explanations for the behaviour of the subjects. Two questions were
asked. First, what is a fair investment in the public good? 75 percent of the non-
economists answered ￿half or more￿of the endowment, and 25 percent answered ￿all￿ .
The other question asked whether they were concerned about fairness in making their
own investment decision. Almost all non-economists answered ￿yes￿ . The answers of
the economics students were more di¢ cult to analyse. More than one-third of them
either refused to answer the ￿rst question or gave uncodable responses. As Marwell
and Ames wrote, ￿it seems that the meaning of ￿ fairness￿in this context was somewhat
alien for this group￿(Marwell and Ames, 1981, p. 309). Those who did answer found
that little or no contribution was fair. With regard to the second question, economics
students were much less concerned with fairness when making their decisions.
Carter and Irons (1991) investigated the behaviour of students of economics com-
pared to students of other disciplines in an ultimatum bargaining game. They found
that economics students behaved more self-interestedly than other students. They
tested the selection and the learning hypothesis, ￿nding that ￿economists are born, not
made￿(Carter and Irons, 1991, p. 174). They claimed that studying economics does
not create rational, self-interested homines economici, but subjects who are particu-
larly concerned with economic incentives self-select into economics. Using a prisoner￿ s
dilemma game, Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) found that economists behave in
more self-interested ways and are much more likely to defect from coalitions. Further,
their results support the learning hypothesis. According to them, ￿exposure to the self-
interest model does in fact encourage self-interested behavior￿(Frank, Gilovich, and
Regan, 1993, p. 159) and inhibit co-operation.
Yezer, Goldfarb, and Poppen (1996) strongly criticised the results obtained by Frank
and his coauthors (1993) from a methodological point of view. They claimed that the
evidence of that paper only implies that economics students display uncooperative
behaviour in specialised games. They conducted a ￿lost-letter￿experiment, in which
envelopes containing currency are dropped in classrooms before the beginning of the
lectures. The return rate on lost letters is used as a measure of co-operation. According
to their results, the ￿real life￿behaviour of economics students is actually more co-
operative than that of subjects studying other disciplines. Similarly, Frey and Meier
(2003) claim that ￿students may play the equilibrium learned in their economics classes,
but they do not apply it to real life situations￿(Frey and Meier, 2003, p. 448). Further,
their results indicate that the particular behaviour of economists is only due to self-
selection. On the basis of Yezer￿ s results, Zsolnai (2003) suggests that there might be
no contradiction between honesty and co-operation, which are two di⁄erent qualities,
and claims that economists￿behaviour is characterised by respect for property rights
and self-interest motivation simultaneously. Finally, Hu and Liu (2003) found evidence
8that economics students are more likely to co-operate in prisoner￿ s dilemma games.
In sum, the results are inconclusive and depend on the di⁄erent settings. Further,
most of these studies are aimed to test whether economics students behave more in
accordance with predictions of the rational/self-interest model of economics. However,
despite the di⁄erent approach assumed in this work, it will be useful, in the course of
our analysis, to compare the above results with ours, taking into account the di⁄erent
perspectives assumed.
4 Methods and Hypotheses
In March 2002, a total of 1333 students of the University of Milan took part in the sur-
vey. 661 of them were sociology students, 345 freshmen and 316 seniors. The remaining
672 were economics students, 354 freshmen and 318 seniors. In each of the four groups
women and men were present in approximately equal number. Regarding these groups
there are two important points to make. First, nobody, among the freshmen, had stud-
ied economics in the previous years of school. Second, the freshmen of economics had
not started economic topics yet, having only studied mathematics, statistics and law
courses. Participation was voluntary and all those asked to participate agreed to do so.
There was no show-up fee paid. Each student was given a sheet containing on the front
the base problem and on the back, at random, one of the remaining three problems.
Thus, each of the four groups was divided into three classes, according to the nature
of the second question. Students were asked to read the question on the front and
only after answering that they could read and answer the one on the back. It was not
possible to change the answer to the ￿rst problem after reading the second one. The
total time for conducting the questionnaire, including our instructions, varied between
20 and 25 minutes, due to the di⁄erence in class sizes.
The four questions are reported in Appendix A. We will refer to them as ques-
tion 1 (base treatment), question 2a (exogenous di⁄erence treatment), question 2b
(discretionary di⁄erence treatment) and question 2c (need treatment). All of the re-
spondents answered question 1. 464 students answered question 2a; of them, 124 were
economics freshmen, 115 economics seniors, 134 sociology freshmen and 91 sociology
seniors. Question 2b was submitted to 451 respondents: 129 economics freshmen, 109
economics seniors, 95 sociology freshmen and 118 sociology seniors. Finally, a total
of 418 students answered question 2c; of them, 101 were economics freshmen, 94 eco-
nomics seniors, 116 sociology freshmen and 107 sociology seniors. As previously noted,
the four problems are formally identical. Resources are to be distributed between two
individuals. Robinson and Friday live on two di⁄erent islands. Robinson lives on island
A and Friday lives on island B. On each island one can till 12 plants. Utility deriving
from the goods is increasing and marginal utility is constant. The two characters obtain
di⁄erent levels of utility from the goods, and are only interested in the utility they get.
￿The only reason why both Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants
9is because they produce fruit, and the higher amount of fruit they obtain the more their
welfare would be; every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for
both people.￿
The respondents are asked to choose a solution among the ones that are provided
so that the distribution is just, recalling that there is no possibility of redistributing
the plants after the allocation. In question 1 no explanation of the di⁄erence between
the individuals is provided.
￿Friday obtains 120 fruits per year from every plant on island B, but he cannot
obtain any fruit from island A￿ s plants.
On both islands Robinson obtains 20 fruits per plant.￿
In question 2a and question 2b the di⁄erence between the individuals is explained. In
the former the two individuals di⁄er in their physical abilities, an exogenous di⁄erence.
￿Both Robinson and Friday put the same amount of work into tilling the
plants; the only way to move from one island to the other is to swim.
Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he cannot
swim and he cannot till any plant on island A.
Robinson is a perfect swimmer and he can therefore till plants on both islands, but
due to a wound caused by the shipwreck he cannot obtain more than 20 fruits per
year from every plant of island A and island B.￿
In question 2b Robinson and Friday put in di⁄erent e⁄orts in tilling their plants,
which is a discretionary di⁄erence.
￿Robinson and Friday can till plants and move from one island to the other in the
same way, but they do not put the same amount of work into tilling the plants.
Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he doesn￿ t
want to go on island A and he will not produce fruits on this island.
To Robinson moving from one island to the other is all the same, but he does not
put as much amount of work into tilling his plants as Friday and he doesn￿ t
produce more than 20 fruits per year from every plant, both on island A and B.￿ 4
Question 2c introduces need considerations. No explanation is provided, but a
minimum level of utility is introduced.
￿The minimum quantity needed by every one of them in order to survive is 300
fruits per year.￿
4The idea of the two islands and, in particular, the fact that Friday works harder but does not want
to go to the other island is an unnecessary complication, whch we realise could have been avoided.
However the answers of the respondents strongly suggest that they were not confused by the design. It
does seem reasonable to believe that the results would not be di⁄erent had the question been simpli￿ed.
10The distributions are provided in terms of resources as well as in terms of utility; the
sum of utility obtained by the individuals is shown too. Three solutions are provided
to question 1, 2a and 2b.
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
Total production of fruits 720
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
The ￿rst solution derives from the application of the utilitarian principle, the second
one is the maximin solution, while the third one is the Egalitarian. The Utilitarian
solution is the fairest in terms of resources, (R: 12-0; F: 0-12): each individual receives
all of the plants of his island. However, this distribution is the most unequal in terms
of utility: (R: 240; F: 1440). Social welfare, though, is maximised. The Rawlsian
distribution is much more unequal in terms of resources, (R: 12-8; F: 0-4): Robinson
receives 8 of the 12 plants of island B, besides the 12 plants of island A. Welfare
distribution is much more equal, though, (R: 400; F: 480). The cost of this greater
equity is a much lower total welfare. Finally, the Egalitarian distribution gives every
individual a utility of 360, distributing the plants as follows: (R: 9-9; F: 3-3). Total
welfare is much less than according to the other allocations. Only the Utilitarian and
the Rawlsian solutions are Pareto-e¢ cient. Applying the maximin solution both the
individuals are better o⁄ than under the Egalitarian distribution, which is not Pareto-
e¢ cient. Besides these distributions a fourth solution5, corresponding to utilitarianism
with a ￿ oor, is provided to question 2c.
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
4 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
5An extension to this study might be the inclusion of the utilitarian solution with a ￿ oor in the
￿rst three treatments. It would also be interesting to combine the idea of a minimum quantity with
the explanations from questions 2a and 2b. However, we believe these not to be crucial points of our
analysis.
11Robinson 12 3 300
Friday 0 9 1080
Total production of fruits 1380
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Plants are divided as follows: (R: 12-3; F: 0-9). Robinson gets 300 fruits, just enough
to survive, and Friday gets a utility of 1080. This distribution is also Pareto-e¢ cient
and, in terms of utility, stands between the Rawlsian and the Utilitarian. The latter is
the only one that does not guarantee the survival of both the individuals.
We explore ￿ve hypotheses.
1. Selection hypothesis. We are interested in testing whether students choosing to
study economics and students choosing to study sociology di⁄er in their ideology.
In order to test this hypothesis we are going to compare the answers of freshmen
of economics and sociology to question 1.
2. Learning hypothesis. We wish to test whether education in￿ uences ideology. To
test this hypothesis we are going to compare the answers to question 1 given by
freshmen and seniors of the same course.
3. Transformation of ideological di⁄erences. We are going to test whether ideolog-
ical di⁄erences increase with the seniority of the subjects. This hypothesis will
be tested by comparing the answers to question 1 given by senior students of
economics and sociology.
4. Relevance of exogenous di⁄erences / discretionary di⁄erences / need. We are
going to test whether contexts a⁄ect the preferences of the respondents. We will
consider each class separately and test the hypothesis of no change in the answer
to the ￿rst and the second question.
5. Agreement hypothesis. Finally, we will compare the answers of the four groups to
questions 2a, 2b and 2c, and test whether clarifying the context or introducing a
minimum utility allows reaching an agreement between the groups.
5 Results
In presenting our results we will proceed as follows. First, we will focus on the di⁄erence
between economics and sociology students, testing the selection and learning hypothe-
ses. Then, we will analyse the e⁄ects of clarifying the context of the distribution and
the extent to which this facilitates an agreement between the parties.6
6Before proceeding to test the above hypotheses we have to make sure that in each group the three
di⁄erent versions of the questionnaire have been randomly distributed among the respondents. For
each group, we have to check that the answers to the ￿rst question follow the same distribution in
everyone of the three classes. For each one of the four groups, we apply the Chi-square test to test the
125.1 Ideology
Table 1 reports the answers to question 1. In the tables and ￿gures we will present, E,
R, U and UF indicate, respectively, Egalitarian, Rawlsian, Utilitarian and Utilitarian
with a ￿ oor.










E 35 22 47 47
R 38 50 37 34
U 27 28 16 19
Let us consider the answers to question 1 given by the freshmen of economics and
sociology ￿rst. This will allow us to test the selection hypothesis. We can easily notice
a consistent di⁄erence between the two distributions, the preferences of the economics
students being more equally distributed between the three options. In both the groups
there are a similar percentage of subjects choosing the Rawlsian principle, 38 percent of
the economics students and 37 percent of the sociology ones. However, while 47 percent
of the sociologists prefer the Egalitarian solution and only 16 percent the Utilitarian,
these percentages are much closer among the economists, respectively 35 percent and
27 percent.
Selection hypothesis (1)
H0 : the choice of a particular option
is unrelated to the university course.
Given the value of the test statistic, ￿2 = 15:57, we reject the null hypothesis (p =
0.0004). This leads to the following result.
Result 1: A selection e⁄ect does exist. Sociology students are more concerned
with equality than economics students and prefer the Egalitarian distribution despite its
ine¢ ciency.
following hypothesis
H0 : the proportion of subjects in each of the option
categories is the same in each of the three classes.
The value of the test statistic is ￿2 = 0:55 for economics freshmen (p = 0.9685), ￿2 = 3:38 for
economics seniors (p = 0.4963), ￿2 = 0:72 for sociology freshmen (p = 0.9488) and ￿2 = 2:98 for
sociology seniors (p = 0.5612). For every group we cannot reject the null hypothesis. This allows us
to proceed to any type of inferential analysis of the data and to test the hypotheses presented above.
135.2 Education: Equity and E¢ ciency
We are going to analyse whether education in￿ uences ideology by comparing the answers
to question 1 given by freshmen and seniors of the same discipline. Table 1 shows
that the answers of the economics seniors are much more di⁄erentiated than those of
their younger colleagues. The percentage of preferences for the Utilitarian allocation
is almost identical in both the groups (27 percent among the freshmen and 28 percent
among the seniors). However the preferences for the Egalitarian distribution diminish
from the freshmen (35 percent) to the seniors (22 percent) to the advantage of the
maximin principle. On the other hand, interestingly, we notice that the distributions
of preferences of sociology freshmen and seniors are almost identical.
Learning hypothesis (2)
H0 : the choice of a particular option is
unrelated to the university year.
We reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.0003) with respect to the economics students
(￿2 = 15:88), but we cannot reject it (p = 0.61569) for the sociology ones (￿2 = 0:97).
This leads to the next result.
Result 2: A learning e⁄ect only exists for the economics students. The Egalitar-
ian solution is less popular with economics seniors, who instead prefer the Rawlsian
distribution.
Unlike Carter and Irons (1991), we can therefore conclude that economists are not
only born, but also made. Our results also seem to contradict the results obtained
by Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993). They found that economics students appear
to be more prone than others to defect, that is to go for the Pareto-inferior solution,
and this trend increases with the seniority of the subjects. They claimed that training
in economics has, amongst others, negative consequences, i.e. anti-social behaviour
(Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1996). Our results indicate the presence of a learning
e⁄ect that re￿ ects an increasing appreciation for the maximin principle. The latter
does satisfy the Pareto criterion7, which is not the case for the Egalitarian distribution.
However, the shift in preferences is not at all in the direction of the Utilitarian solution,
which suggests that senior students are no more concerned with the maximisation of
output than their younger colleagues. Given that senior students of economics are more
likely to favour inequality only if this implies making both the individuals better o⁄,
training in economics does not seem to have negative consequences.
However, we have to bear in mind the di⁄erences between the experiments we dis-
cussed in Section 3 and our study. Carter and Irons (1991) and Frank and his colleagues
7It is interesting to notice that several studies show that the Pareto principle is not a very popular
concept with economics and business students (e.g. McClelland and Rohrbaugh, 1978; Amiel and
Cowell, 1999). However, non-economists seem to believe in it even less (Amiel and Cowell, 1999).
14(1993) were interested in ￿nding whether exposure to the rational model of economics
makes subjects behave in a more self-interested way. Our approach di⁄ers in two ways.
First, we concentrate our analysis on the perception of fairness of the subjects rather
than on their behaviour. Second, self-interest bias is drastically reduced by the elimi-
nation of monetary incentives8.
5.3 Does Education Increase Ideological Di⁄erences?
We want to check whether ideological di⁄erences between the students of the two courses
increase with the di⁄erent education or remain stable. Looking at Table 1 we can see
that the di⁄erence between the two distributions seems to have increased from the ￿rst
to the last year. Let us test the hypothesis of transformation of ideological di⁄erences.
The null hypothesis is the same as hypothesis (1). The value of the test statistic is
￿2 = 44:5 and we reject the null hypothesis (p = 2.177e-10). Moreover, the Cramer
coe¢ cient9 shows that the ideological di⁄erence between the seniors of the two courses
is much greater than between their younger colleagues.
Result 3: The ideological di⁄erence between senior students of economics and so-
ciology is greater than between the freshmen of the two courses.
5.4 The Impact of Context
Table 2 reports the answers to the three di⁄erent versions of question 2.










2a E 15 7 25 32
R 63 76 60 60
U 22 17 15 8
2b E 12 6 13 14
R 34 28 38 36
U 54 66 49 50
2c E 30 19 41 36
R 41 44 44 32
U 4 1 0 3
UF 26 36 15 30
8Note that self-interest bias cannot be completely eliminated. Although the respondents have to
divide the resources between two hypothetical individuals, they might still act as vicarious stakeholders.
9The Cramer coe¢ cient measures the degree of relation between two sets of variables. The value of
this coe¢ cient almost doubles passing from the freshermen￿ s sample to the seniors￿one, from 0:15 to
0:27, indicating a much stronger relation between the preferences of the senior students and the course
attended.
15Unlike the base version, in the exogenous di⁄erence treatment the absolute majority
of each group prefer the Rawlsian solution. This trend can be understood if we consider
that both the individuals exert the same e⁄ort, but they di⁄er in their physical abilities,
a characteristic they cannot be held responsible for. Maximising the utility of the more
disadvantaged is considered fair by most of the individuals, whatever group they belong
to.
In the case of discretionary di⁄erences, the Utilitarian solution is the most preferred
by each one of the four groups. This result is even more striking considering that
utilitarianism was the least preferred solution to the ￿rst problem by three of the four
groups and only the second choice of the economics seniors. The two individuals are
held accountable for their outcomes when they di⁄er in their e⁄ort. The Utilitarian
solution, which rewards the character that puts in more e⁄ort, is preferred to the other
allocations in each group. The answers to this problem are even more homogenous
then those to question 2a. The four classes present the same order of preferences: the
maximin solution is the second choice, followed by the Egalitarian.
Need seems the most obvious force driving the results on question 2c. Economics
freshmen and seniors and sociology freshmen prefer the maximin solution, while among
the sociology seniors egalitarianism is still the ￿rst choice. The four groups share the
same scepticism for the Utilitarian solution, which does not guarantee the survival of
the more disadvantage individual. Egalitarianism still proves to be more appreciated by
the sociology students; however, even among them, the preferences for the Egalitarian
solution decrease from freshmen to seniors in favour of utilitarianism with a ￿ oor. The
latter seems to exert a particular attraction on more mature students, whatever course
they attend.
In order to analyse the relevance of context we are going to compare the answers
given by each student to the ￿rst and the second question, anlysing ￿rst problem 2a
and 2b and then problem 2c. The results of all the tests of di⁄erences are reported in
Appendix B.
Concerning those subjects who received question 2a and those who received question
2b, we can test the signi￿cance of the change in their by applying the Stuart-Maxwell
test10.
Relevance of exogenous / discretionary di⁄erences (3)
H0 : there is no change in the preferences of the
subjects passing from the ￿rst to the second problem.
In each case we can reject the null hypothesis. This leads to the following result:
Result 4: Introducing either exogenous or discretionary di⁄erences has changed the
preferences of the subjects, whatever group they belong to.
10The Stuart-Maxwell test is a variation of McNemar￿ s test appropriate for case-control comparisons
involving 3x3 contingency tables. It can be used to test marginal homogeneity between two raters across
all categories simultaneously ( for a general discussion see Fleiss, 1981).
16With reference to both classes of each of the four groups, we can look for those
single categories for which the di⁄erences are signi￿cant. We can collapse the original
3x3 tables into 2x2 tables11 and apply the McNemar test to three di⁄erent hypotheses.
H0 : among the respondents who change their (4)
preference, the probability that a respondent
will switch from E (R / U) to not E (not R /
not U) will be the same as the probability that
a respondent will change from not E (not R /
not U) to E (R / U).
In the case of exogenous di⁄erences, for each of the four groups we reject the null
hypothesis concerning the Egalitarian and the maximin allocation. Once it is explained
that the lower productivity of one of the two characters is due to a handicap the consent
for the Egalitarian solution diminishes, while more subjects are in favour of the Rawlsian
allocation. Furthermore, considering the economics seniors, we can also reject the null
hypothesis concerning the Utilitarian distribution, which is preferred by fewer subjects
as a solution to problem 2a.
Result 5: With the introduction of exogenous di⁄erences, the preferences of each
group for the Egalitarian distribution have decreased in favour of the maximin solu-
tion. The preferences of the economics seniors for both the Egalitarian and Utilitarian
solutions have diminished in favour of the maximin one.
Let us consider the discretionary di⁄erence treatment. For each of the four groups
we reject the null hypothesis concerning the Egalitarian and Utilitarian solutions. When
the di⁄erent productivity is explained in terms of e⁄ort the preferences for the Egali-
tarian distribution decrease, while more people prefer the Utilitarian allocation. Con-
sidering the economics seniors, we reject the null concerning each of the three options:
the preferences for the maximin and the Egalitarian distribution diminish from the ￿rst
to the second problem, in favour of the Utilitarian allocation.
Result 6: With the introduction of discretionary di⁄erences, the preferences of
each group for the Egalitarian distribution have decreased in favour of the Utilitarian
solution. The preferences of the economics seniors for both the Egalitarian and maximin
solutions have diminished in favour of the Utilitarian one.
As revealed by these results, passing from the ￿rst to the second question has sig-
ni￿cantly lowered the consent for the Egalitarian solution among all the groups. This
leads to an important result:
11In these 2x2 tables the answers to the ￿rst and to the second question will be categorised respec-
tively as Egalitarian and not Egalitarian, Rawlsian and not Rawlsian, Utilitarian and not Utilitarian.
17Result 7: The ine¢ cient allocation seems to be an inadequate solution to the prob-
lem, once the circumstances of the distribution are clear.
Let us ￿nally test hypothesis of relevance of need with respect to the subjects who
received question 2c12. For each group we can reject the null hypothesis with reference
to the Utilitarian solution. Need considerations have driven the preferences for the
latter to drastically fall in every group. In addition, considering the senior students we
reject the null concerning two other mechanisms: the egalitarian with respect to the
sociology seniors, and the maximin with reference to the seniors of economics. The two
groups show much less consent for these principles when answering question 2c.
Result 8: With the introduction of a threshold, the preferences of each group for the
Utilitarian distribution have drastically fallen. Moreover, the preferences of the sociology
seniors for the Egalitarian allocation have decreased, while the maximin solution is
preferred by fewer economics seniors.
From Figures 1 and 2 we can intuitively infer that when either exogenous or dis-





























12While the ￿rst problem presents three solutions, four distinct distributions are provided as possible
solutions to question 2c. The Stuart-Maxwell test cannot be used to test marginal homogeneity in
this case and, furthermore, no appropriate test for case-control comparisons involving 3x4 contingency


























Let us conclude our analysis investigating whether clarifying the context of the
distribution leads to a common solution accepted by the parties.
Agreement hypothesis (5)
H0 : the proportion of subjects in each of
the option categories is the same in
each group
Let us ￿rst consider the case of exogenous di⁄erences. The value of the test statistic
is ￿2 = 29:21 and we reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.00005): although in each of
the four groups the absolute majority prefer the Rawlsian solution, the preferences of
the four groups do not follow the same distribution. We can test hypothesis (5) with
reference to four di⁄erent cases: economics and sociology freshmen, economics and
sociology seniors, economics freshmen and seniors, sociology freshmen and seniors. We
reject the null (p = 0.00001) only concerning economics and sociology seniors, given
the high Chi-square value, ￿2 = 22:9. We cannot reject it in the other cases. Testing
the hypothesis with economics and sociology freshmen we have ￿2 = 4:49 (p = 0.1059).
Testing it with economics freshmen and seniors the Chi-square value is ￿2 = 5:68 (p
= 0.0584). In the case of sociology freshmen and seniors the result is ￿2 = 3:39 (p =
0.1836). Let us make two interesting points. First, contrary to the answers to question
1, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the preferences of economics and sociology
19freshmen follow the same distribution. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no
di⁄erence between the preferences of economics freshmen and seniors. Let us summarise
these results.
Result 9: When exogenous di⁄erences are introduced, the absolute majority of
every group prefer the maximin principle as a solution to the problem. In addition,
the di⁄erence due to the selection e⁄ect as well as the disagreement between economics
freshmen and seniors has disappeared.
In the case of discretionary di⁄erences, testing hypothesis (5) with respect to all
the groups the value of the test statistic is ￿2 = 8:5. We cannot reject the hypothesis
according to which the preferences of the four groups follow the same distribution (p =
0.2037).
Result 10: The preferences of the four groups with respect to the problem with
discretionary di⁄erences follow the same distribution. The Utilitarian allocation is the
most preferred, the maximin solution is the second choice and the Egalitarian is the
least preferred.
Finally, we consider the need version of the distribution problem. Testing hypothesis
(5) with reference to the four groups the value of the test statistic is ￿2 = 26:5 and
we have to reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.0017). The only case in which we cannot
reject it (p = 0.1316) is comparing the answers of the economics freshmen and seniors,
￿2 = 5:62. With respect to them, we can conclude that their preferences follow the
same distribution. Unlike other experiments (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavy, 1987a,
1987b; Lissowsky, Tyszka, and Okrasa, 1991), the introduction of a ￿ oor did not enable
a solution accepted by all of the parties. However, we notice that an agreement looks
closer now than in the ￿rst problem. Three groups prefer the Rawlsian solution and even
among the sociology seniors the percentage of preferences for the maximin allocation
is very close to the ￿rst choice. The solution we proposed according to utilitarianism
with a ￿ oor only guarantees the survival of the least advantaged character. That did
not look enough to most of the subjects, who instead preferred maximising his utility.
An interesting extension would be to test whether solutions with an intermediate ￿ oor
would lead to greater consensus. The following summarises these results.
Result 11: In the need treatment all of the groups, except for the sociology seniors,
prefer the maximin allocation as a solution to the question, while the utilitarian distri-
bution is by far the least preferred by each group. Utilitarianism with a ￿oor is more
preferred by senior students.
6 Conclusions
Several studies have been conducted to analyse whether judgments of fairness are con-
text dependent. To our knowledge, though, this is the ￿rst attempt to explore distribu-
20tive justice analysing the extent to which clarifying the context of a distribution favours
greater consensus on what is just. We surveyed ￿rst and last year undergraduate stu-
dents of economics and sociology, focusing on contextual factors related to responsibility
and need considerations. Let us summarise the main results we obtained.
A selection e⁄ect does exist. The ideology of students choosing to study sociology
di⁄ers from that of students who choose to study economics, the former group being
much more concerned about equality. Further, the di⁄erences in ideology increase with
the seniority of the subjects. Economics seniors show a higher appreciation of the
Pareto principle than their younger colleagues, which is not the case with sociology
students (with reference to this point see also Amiel and Cowell, 1999, although the
authors do not distinguish between selection and learning e⁄ects). However, training in
economics does not seem to in￿ uence the concern for the maximisation of total output.
These results cannot be directly compared to most of the literature about the di⁄erences
between economists and non-economists, these studies being aimed to analyse whether
students of economics behave in a more self-interested way than students of other
disciplines. In any case, unlike the results obtained by Marwell and Ames (1981), our
results indicate that even economics students have an interest in fairness. This may be
due to the di⁄erent design of the question.
Clarifying the context of the distribution, by either explaining the di⁄erences be-
tween the individuals or introducing a minimum survival utility, signi￿cantly in￿ uences
perception of fairness of the subjects, whatever group they belong to. Whenever it is
not e¢ cient, the egalitarian principle seems to provide inadequate solutions if the cir-
cumstances of the distributions are clear. Need considerations seem to drive the results
when a ￿ oor is introduced: the utilitarian principle is abandoned, if the solution it
prescribes does not enable every individual to reach the minimum utility. Interestingly
sociology seniors develop an increased preference for utilitarianism with a ￿ oor relative
to sociology freshmen.
The most notable result is that clarifying the context favours greater consensus on
what is fair. The maximin criterion proves to be an adequate solution to the distri-
bution problem when exogenous di⁄erences, for which the individuals cannot be held
responsible, are introduced. The utilitarian principle, on the contrary, meets a great
success when the individuals put in di⁄erent e⁄orts (discretionary di⁄erences). The
introduction of a ￿ oor does not seem to be an equally successful way to achieve a social
agreement. However, only a particular solution corresponding to the utilitarian princi-
ple with a ￿ oor constraint has been explored. There are several interesting extensions
for future research and a series of social experiments should be conducted in order to
point out a plausible threshold that would appear just to most people.
21Appendix A
Question 1
After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two di⁄erent islands divided
by a narrow but deep channel.
On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both
Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce fruit
and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be; every
additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people.
It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the plants
between Robinson and Friday. You￿ ve been given the following information, which the
two survivors also know:
Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B.
All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much fruit
they produce depends on the way they are cultivated.
Friday obtains 120 fruits per year from every plant on island B, but he cannot
obtain any fruit from island A￿ s plants.
On both islands Robinson obtains 20 fruits per plant.
There￿ s no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and there￿ s
also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced.
How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so
that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just?
Choose:
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
Total production of fruits 720
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Question 2a
22After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two di⁄erent islands divided
by a narrow but deep channel.
On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both
Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce fruit
and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be; every
additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people.
It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the plants
between Robinson and Friday.
You￿ ve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know:
Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B.
All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much fruit
they produce depends on the way they are cultivated.
Both Robinson and Friday put the same amount of work into tilling the
plants; the only way to move from one island to the other is to swim.
Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he cannot
swim and he cannot till any plant on island A.
Robinson is a perfect swimmer and he can therefore till plants on both islands, but
due to a wound caused by the shipwreck he cannot obtain more than 20 fruits per
year from every plant of island A and island B.
There￿ s no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and there￿ s
also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced.
How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so
that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just?
Choose:
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
Total production of fruits 720
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
23Question 2b
After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two di⁄erent islands divided
by a narrow but deep channel.
On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both
Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce fruit
and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be; every
additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people.
It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the plants
between Robinson and Friday.
You￿ ve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know:
Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B.
All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much fruit
they produce depends on the way they are cultivated.
Robinson and Friday can till plants and move from one island to the
other in the same way, but they do not put the same amount of work into
tilling the plants.
Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he doesn￿ t
want to go on island A and he will not produce fruits on this island.
To Robinson moving from one island to the other is all the same, but he does not
put as much amount of work into tilling his plants as Friday and he doesn￿ t produce
more than 20 fruits per year from every plant, both on island A and B.
There￿ s no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and there￿ s
also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced.
How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so
that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just?
Choose:
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
24Total production of fruits 720
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Question 2c
After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two di⁄erent islands divided
by a narrow but deep channel.
On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both
Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce fruit
and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be; every
additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people.
It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the plants
between Robinson and Friday.
You￿ ve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know:
The minimum quantity needed by every one of them in order to survive
is 300 fruits per year.
Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B
All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much fruit
they produce depends on the way they are cultivated.
Friday obtains 120 fruits per year from every plant on island B, but he cannot
obtain any fruit from island A￿ s plants.
On both islands Robinson obtains 20 fruits per plant.
There￿ s no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and there￿ s
also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced.
How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so
that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just?
Choose:
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
25Total production of fruits 720
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
4 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 3 300
Friday 0 9 1080
Total production of fruits 1380
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Appendix B
We report the Chi-square values resulting from testing hypotheses (3) and (4). The
numbers in brackets represent the p-values.
Table 3 reports the results of the application of the Stuart-Maxwell tests to hypoth-
esis (3).



























The following tables report the results of the application of the McNemar tests
to hypothesis (4) with respect to economics freshmen, economics seniors, sociology
freshmen and sociology seniors.
Table 4. Economics Freshmen (McNemar tests)






















26Table 5. Economics Seniors (McNemar tests)






















Table 6. Sociology Freshmen (McNemar tests)






















Table 7. Sociology Seniors (McNemar tests)
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